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Abstract
The lexicographic closure of any given finite set D of normal de-
faults is defined. A conditional assertion a ∼ b is in this lexicographic
closure if, given the defaults D and the fact a, one would conclude
b. The lexicographic closure is essentially a rational extension of D,
and of its rational closure, defined in a previous paper. It provides
a logic of normal defaults that is different from the one proposed by
R. Reiter and that is rich enough not to require the consideration
of non-normal defaults. A large number of examples are provided to
show that the lexicographic closure corresponds to the basic intuitions
behind Reiter’s logic of defaults.
1 Plan of this paper
Section 2 is a general introduction, describing the goal of this paper, in
relation with Reiter’s Default Logic and the program proposed in [12] by
Lehmann and Magidor. Section 3 first discusses at length some general prin-
ciples of the logic of defaults, with many examples, and, then, puts this paper
in perspective relatively to previous work. Section 4 sets the stage for this
paper by describing the intuitive meaning of default information and the
formal representation used in this paper for defaults. It singles out two dif-
ferent possible interpretations for defaults: a prototypical and a presumptive
∗This work was partially supported by the Jean and Helene Alfassa fund for research
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reading. Section 5 briefly discusses the relation between defaults and mate-
rial implications. This paper proposes a meaning to any set D of defaults.
This meaning is presented in a complex construction, that is described in full
only in Section 9. The different aspects of this construction are presented
separately at first. In Section 6, the meaning of a set consisting of a single
default will be studied. Reiter’s proposal does not enable the use of a default
the antecedent of which is not known to hold. The new perspective of this
paper allows much more sophisticated ways of using default information. In
particular the default (a : b) may be used to conclude that, if b is known
to be false, then a should be presumed to be false too. Section 7 is a short
digression on non-normal defaults. It is shown that such defaults can never
be understood if one requires that the closure of a set of defaults be rational.
Section 8 studies interacting normal defaults that have the same rank (or
strength). We propose that, in the case of contradictory defaults of the same
rank, we try to satisfy as many as possible. This proposal is in disagreement
with D. Poole’s [15], but in agreement with the Maximal Entropy approach
of [6]. It is shown that this idea guarantees rationality. In Section 9 a for-
mal description of our complete proposal is given. First, a model-theoretic
construction is presented: given a finite set D of normal defaults, a modular
model is defined and the lexicographic closure of D is the rational conse-
quence relation defined by this model. Then, an equivalent characterization
in terms of maxiconsistent sets is given. Section 10 presents examples and
the description of the answer provided by our proposal. One of those shows
how and why this proposal disagrees with the Maximal Entropy approach.
Section 11 is a concluding discussion.
2 Introduction
In [16], R. Reiter proposed a formal framework for Default Reasoning. Its fo-
cal point is the definition of an extension. In [17], R. Reiter and G. Criscuolo
found that, in this framework, one must consider non-normal defaults. Non-
normal defaults have, since then, been taken as the basic piece of default
information by the logic programming community. An alternative point of
view is propounded here. An answer is provided to the following question:
given a set D of normal defaults, what are the normal defaults that should
be considered as following from D, or entailed by D? This answer provides
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a Logic of Defaults that does not suffer from the problems of multiple exten-
sions or the inabilty of Reiter’s system to cope satisfactorily with disjunctive
information. There is no need to consider non-normal defaults. In [12], M.
Magidor and the author proposed, as their first thesis [Thesis 1.1 there], that
the set of defaults entailed by any set D be rational. This requirement is
met. The rational closure of a set D, defined there, is not the set looked for,
since it does not provide for inheritance of generic properties to exceptional
subclasses. In their second thesis [Thesis 5.25 in Section 5.9], they proposed
to look for some uniform way of constructing a rational superset of the ratio-
nal closure of a knowledge base. The answer provided here, the lexicographic
closure, is almost such a set, and a simple variation meets the condition in
full. Independently, in [1], Benferhat&al. proposed a similar lexicographic
construction based on an unspecified ordering of single defaults. When one
applies their construction to the ordering on single defaults defined in [12],
one obtains the lexicographic closure presented in this paper. Its computa-
tional complexity has been studied in [2] and [9]: it is in ∆p2 and is NP-hard
and co-NP-hard. The lexicographic closure is a syntactic construction in the
sense of [14], i.e., it is sensitive to the presentation of the default information.
3 Nonmonotonic Reasoning
3.1 The Rational Enterprise
We shall briefly summarize [8] and [12] and set up the stage. This section
was prepared in collaboration with David Makinson. Some nonmonotonic
inference relations are better behaved than others. In particular, there are
some simple closure conditions that appear highly desirable: reflexivity, left-
logical-equivalence, right-weakening, and, or, and cautious monotonicity. The
family of relations that satisfy those properties is closed under intersection.
Therefore, given a set K of ordered pairs (a, b) of formulas (which we shall
write a ∼ b to remind us that they are meant to be elements of an inference
relation), there is a natural and convincing way of defining a distinguished
superset of K that satisfies those conditions: simply put Kp, called the pref-
erential closure of K, to be the intersection of all supersets of K that satisfy
the six conditions above.
However, there are other desirable “closure” (in a broad sense) properties
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that are much more difficult to deal with. Rational monotonicity defines
a family of relations that is not closed under intersection. Other desirable
conditions appear to be incapable of a purely formal expression, but may
be conveyed intuitively and are illustrable by examples. Because of their
informal nature, their identification is not cut and dried, but four seem to be
of particular interest:
1. the presumption of typicality,
2. the presumption of independence,
3. priority to typicality, and
4. respect for specificity.
There may be other desirable properties.
(1) The presumption of typicality begins where rational monotonicity
leaves off. Suppose p ∼ x ∈ K. By rational monotonicity, the closure of
K, K+, will contain either p ∧ q ∼ x or p ∼ ¬q. But which? No guideline
is given. The presumption of typicality (it may as well be called “a weak
presumption of monotonicity”) tells us that, in the absence of a convincing
reason to accept the latter, we should prefer the former.
Example 1 if K has p ∼ x as its sole element, there is no apparent rea-
son why the relation K+ ⊇ K that we regard as “generated” by K should
contain p ∼ ¬q. Hence, it should contain p ∧ q ∼ x. Note: In this and all
examples, p, q, r . . . x, y, z are understood to be distinct atomic formulas, i.e.,
propositional variables.
(2) The presumption of independence is a sharpening of the presumption
of typicality, and thus a stronger presumption of monotonicity. For, even
if typicality is lost with respect to one consequent, we may still presume
typicality with respect to another, “unless there is reason to the contrary”.
Example 2 Suppose K = {p ∼ x, p ∼ ¬q}. Presumption of typicality can-
not be used to support p ∧ q ∼ x, since K+ is known to contain p ∼ ¬q.
Presumption of independence tells us we should expect x to be independent
of q, and therefore unaffected by the truth of q. Therefore, it tells us, we
should accept p ∧ q ∼ x.
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Example 3 Suppose K = {p ∼ x, p ∧ q ∼ ¬x, p ∼ y}. Notice that p ∼ ¬q
is in Kp, the preferential closure of K, and, therefore, the presumption of
typicality cannot convince us to accept p ∧ q ∼ y. But, we should presume
that x is independent from y, as there is no reason to think otherwise, and
put p ∧ q ∼ y in the desired consequence relation K+ ⊇ K.
Remark: The two conditions above may be interpreted as related to and
strengthening the condition of rational monotonicity. The difference between
rational monotonicity, on one hand, and the presumptions of typicality and
independence is subtle, and may be easily overlooked. Rational monotonicity
is a constraint on the product K+ ⊇ K, whereas presumptions of typicality
and independence are best understood as rough and partial guides to the
construction of a desirable K+.
(3) Priority to typicality tells us that, in a situation of clash between two
inferences, one of them based on the presumption of typicality, the other one
based on the presumption of independence, then we should prefer the former.
Two examples are provided now.
Example 4 Suppose K = {p ∼ x, p ∧ q ∼ ¬x}. The presumption of typi-
cality offers p ∧ q ∧ r ∼ ¬x, since there is no compelling reason to accept
p ∧ q ∼ ¬r. The presumption of independence offers both p ∧ q ∧ r ∼ ¬x
and p ∧ q ∧ r ∼ x. It clearly would not be justified to draw both conclusions.
Priority to typicality, tells us to prefer the former.
Example 5 Suppose K = {p ∼ x, true ∼ q, q ∼ ¬x}. The presumption of
independence, acting on the last assertion of K, offers q ∧ p ∼ ¬x. This is
in conflict with p ∧ q ∼ x that is offerred by presumption of typicality, from
the first assertion. Priority to typicality says we should prefer the latter
conclusion.
(4) Respect for specificity tells us that, in case of clash between two pre-
sumptions, one of them based on an assertion with a more specific antecedent
than the other, we should prefer the conclusion based on the more specific
antecedent. This principle is generally accepted and has been discussed in
the literature. It is somewhat difficult to formalize: what does “based on”
mean? It is closely related to the priority to typicality principle described
just above, but the exact relationship between those two principles still needs
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clarification. In examples 4 and 5, the priority given to typicality achieves
precisely the respect for specificity we are looking for. In example 4, we
prefer to use p ∧ q ∼ ¬x to p ∼ x also because p ∧ q is strictly more specific
than p, i.e., p ∧ q |= p. In example 5, we prefer to use p ∼ x to q ∼ ¬x also
because p is defeasibly more specific than q, since, from true ∼ q, we shall
conclude p ∼ q by presumption of typicality, or, preferably, presumption of
independence. Another, more technical, reason to view p as more specific
than q is that the rank (the definition found in [12] is explained at the end
of 9.1) of p is strictly greater than the rank of q.
Of course, along with the above principles, one should also not forget
avoidance of junk: the desired K+ ⊇ K should avoid gratuitous additions
(otherwise, e.g. the total relation would do). In other words, K+ should be,
in some sense, “least” among the supersets of K satisfying the desired condi-
tions. “Least” should certainly imply minimal in the set-theoretic sense, i.e.,
no strict subset is acceptable, but cannot mean “included in any acceptable
superset”, since our family is not closed under intersection.
In [12], a construction is given, that, given any (finite) set K of pairs
a ∼ b provides a rational extension K such that K ⊆ Kp ⊆ K = K
p
= K
that behaves well so far as the presumption of typicality and the respect for
specificity are concerned. However it does not pay much heed to the pre-
sumption of independence. For example it does not legitimize the conclusion
p ∧ q ∼ y in example 3 above. The purpose of the present paper is to propose
a different construction that performs better in this last respect, whilst not
losing satisfaction of the other formal and informal properties.
3.2 Related Work
R. Reiter’s [16] was certainly one of the most influential papers in the field of
knowledge representation. It proposed a way of dealing with default informa-
tion. In short, it proposed to represent such information as normal defaults
and to define the meaning of a set of normal defaults as the set of exten-
sions it provides to any set of sentences. In a follow-up paper [17], R. Reiter
and G. Criscuolo remarked that, in many instances, the simple-minded for-
malization of situations involving more than one (normal) default was not
adequate: the extension semantics enforced some unexpected and undesir-
able consequences. They proposed to cure this problem by considering an
extended class of defaults: semi-normal defaults.
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In this paper, a different perspective on default reasoning is proposed.
Normal defaults are considered and sets of normal defaults are given a mean-
ing that is different from the one proposed in [16]. With this meaning, the
interactions between defaults are as expected and the consideration of non-
normal defaults is superflous. This perspective is in line with the first thesis
of [12], that requires a set of defaults to define a rational consequence relation.
It is also almost in line with the second thesis of the same paper, that requires
a set of defaults to define a consequence relation that extends the rational
closure of the set of defaults, and a straightforward variation will be shown
to extend rational closure. This goal of implementing Reiter’s program, but
with different techniques, is similar to David Poole’s [15]. The present paper
also shares some technical insights with Poole’s. It may be considered also
as a close relative of the maximal entropy approach of [6, 7], but the seman-
tics proposed here is different from the one obtained from maximal entropy
considerations. This paper is a descendant of [11]. The main ideas of the
lexicographic construction proposed in this paper have been, independently,
proposed in [1]. There, the initial ordering of single defaults was left for the
user to chose. A specific ordering of single defaults is used here.
4 What is default information?
Default information is information about the way things usually are. The
paradigmatical example of such information, that has been used by most
researchers in the field, is birds fly. Syntactically, a default is a pair of
propositions that will be written as (a : b), where a and b are formulas (of a
propositional calculus for this paper). Remember that only normal defaults
are considered, so that (a : b) is our notation for Reiter’s a:b
b
. The default
(true : b) will written as (: b). Given a set D of defaults representing some
background information about the way things typically behave and a formula
a representing our knowledge of the situation at hand, we shall ask what
formulas should be accepted as presumably true. The meaning of a set
of defaults D will therefore be understood as the set of pairs (conditional
assertions) c ∼ d it entails, i.e., for which d should be presumed to be true if
c is our knowledge about the specific situation, i.e. represents the conjunction
of the facts we know to be true. It is probably reasonable to expect that the
conditional assertion c ∼ d be entailed by a set D containing the default
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(c : d), but this will be discussed in the sequel. Notice, that we may, as
well, consider that a set of normal defaults entails a set a defaults, confusing
“snake” (∼) and colon (:).
The meaning of defaults is a delicate affair and it will be discussed in
depth now. In [17], a prototypical reading is proposed: birds fly being under-
stood as typical birds fly. But, there is another possible reading: birds are
presumed to fly unless there is evidence to the contrary. This second reading
will be called the presumptive reading. The conclusions of this paper may be
summarized in three sentences. The two readings above are almost equiva-
lent when isolated defaults are concerned, they are not when sets of defaults
are concerned. The rational closure construction of [12] is the correct for-
malization of the prototypical reading. The presumptive reading is the one
intended by Default Logic and its formalization is the topic of this paper.
The distinction between the two readings will be explained with an exam-
ple. This example is formally equivalent to the Swedes example described
informally in [12, page 4]. In this example, as in all other examples of this
paper, the formulas appearing in the defaults will be represented by mean-
ingless letters and not, as customary in the field, by meaningful sentences.
The remark that logic, the study of deductive processes, may be concerned
only with the form of the propositions, and not with their meaning, dates
back to Aristotle. The use of semantically loaded formulas and the import
of the reader’s knowledge of the world may only hamper the study of the
formal properties of nonmonotonic deduction (that should perhaps be called
induction). When a given example is formally isomorphic to some well known
folklore example (or at least to some possible formalization of it), it will be
pointed out.
Example 6 (Swedes) Let p and q be different propositional variables. Let
D be the set of two defaults: {(: p), (: q)}. Accepting D means that we
believe, by default, that p is true, and also that q is true. Following the pro-
totypical reading, then, typically p is true and typically q is true. Following
the presumptive reading p is presumed to be true unless there is evidence
to the contrary and q is presumed to be true unless there is evidence to the
contrary. Suppose now that we have the information that ¬p ∨ ¬q is true,
i.e., at least one of p or q is false.
Using the prototypical reading, we shall conclude that the situation at
hand is not typical. In such a case none of our two defaults is applicable:
8
typically p is true, but this is not a typical situation, and therefore we shall
not conclude, even by default (i.e. defeasibly) that p ∨ q holds true.
Using the presumptive reading, on the contrary, we shall conclude that
p ∨ q should be presumed to be true unless there is evidence to the contrary,
and since there is no evidence of this sort, it should be presumed to be true.
We should therefore presume that exactly one of p and q holds.
5 Default vs. Material Implication
A very natural feeling is that the meaning of any single default (a : b) should
be closely related to the meaning of the material implication a→ b. This last
formula will be called thematerial counterpart of the default (a : b). Similarly
the meaning of a set of defaults D should be related to the meaning of the
set of its material counterparts.
It turns out that, both in the rational closure construction of [12] and in
the construction proposed in this paper, the meaning of a default (a : b) (that
is an element of the set D of defaults accepted by a reasoner) in the presence
of knowledge c, either its material counterpart a→ b or void (i.e. equivalent
to a tautology: true). Both constructions may therefore be described by
pinpointing, given specific information c, which of the defaults of D are
meaningful. If Dc is this set and Mc the set of material counterparts of
Dc, then d should be presumed true iff d is a logical consequence of c ∪Mc,
i.e., Mc, c |= d. This semantics fits well into the implicit content framework
proposed in [18].
6 Single Defaults
Let D be the singleton set {(a : b)}, where a and b are arbitrary formulas.
We propose the following meaning to D:
• if the information at hand c is consistent with a→ b, i.e., c 6|= a ∧ ¬b
then the default is meaningful and d is presumed iff c, a→ b |= d
• otherwise, the default is meaningless and d is presumed iff c |= d.
An equivalent, more model-theoretic description, of the consequence re-
lation determined by D is the following: the rational consequence relation
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that is defined by the modular model in which the propositional models are
ranked in two levels: on the bottom level (the more normal one) all models
that satisfy the material implication a→ b, on the top level all other models.
This is the most natural understanding of the default information if a is
true then b is presumably true, and completely in line with D. Poole’s [15]
treatment of defaults. Notice, though, that it does not always agree with
Reiter’s treatment and only almost agrees with rational closure. If the in-
formation at hand c logically implies a, then the perspective proposed here
agrees with Reiter’s: d is presumed to be true iff d is an element of the unique
extension of (D, {c}).
To see the difference with Reiter’s treatment, suppose a and b are different
propositional variables and consider c to be ¬b. The perspective defended
here will support the claim that ¬a should be presumed to be true, i.e., a
should be presumed to be false. For Reiter, on the contrary, there is a unique
extension: Cn(¬b) (Cn is the logical consequence operator) and therefore we
should not presume anything about a. Similarly if c is true, the present
perspective will support a→ b, whereas Reiter will not.
The comparison with rational closure is more subtle. Our perspective
agrees with rational closure except when a |= ¬b. This is quite an out of
the ordinary situation: a is logically equivalent to something of the form
¬b ∧ e, and the default is of the form if b is false and e is true, then assume
b is true. Such a default will probably never be used in practice, but its
consideration is nevertheless enlightening. In such a situation, the present
perspective claims that the meaning of the default (¬b ∧ e : b) is that all
models that satisfy ¬b ∧ e are on the top level. In other terms, if c 6|= ¬b ∧ e,
the default is meaningful and means ¬b ∧ e→ b, which is logically equivalent
to e→ b, but if c |= ¬b ∧ e, then the default is meaningless. The treatment
of this last case is well in line with the presumptive reading: if b is known
to be false, then b should not be assumed to be true. If we look at the way
rational closure deals with this case, we see that it agrees with the present
perspective in the first case (i.e., if c 6|= ¬b ∧ e) but disagrees with it in the
second case. Rational closure accepts any conclusion from the information
that e is true and b is false. This is in line with the prototypical reading of
the default: if e is true and b is false, then typically b is true may only mean
that it is inconsistent for e ∧ ¬b to be true and therefore one should conclude
anything when this happens.
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The new perspective does not always support each member of the rational
closure, but the reader may check that the solution it supports is always
rational (in the technical sense of [12]). A proof of this, in a more general
setting, will be given in Section 9. How come our proposal is different from
rational closure, that seemed to be the only reasonable one? Let K be
the conditional knowledge base containing the single assertion e ∧ ¬b ∼b.
The rational relation proposed here in place of the rational closure does not
contain e ∧ ¬b ∼b. It is not an extension of K and therefore does not satisfy
Thesis 5.25: “The set of assertions entailed by any set of assertions K is a
rational superset of the rational closure of K” of [12]. This departure from
Thesis 5.25 is not central to our proposal and a slight variant of it would
satisfy Thesis 5.25 by treating differently only those useless defaults discussed
just above. This variant does not seem to fully fit the presumptive reading
of defaults, though. If we denote by Kl the (lexicographic) construction
proposed in this paper, the variant we have in mind may be defined in the
following way: accept a ∼ b iff either a has a rank for K and a ∼ b ∈ Kl, or
a has no rank. This variant gives a superset (sometimes strict) of Kl, that
is also a superset (sometimes strict) of the rational closure K.
7 Seminormal defaults
This paper will show that, if one accepts a semantics that is different from
Reiter’s, the reasons that compelled him to introduce non-normal defaults
disappear, and one may restrict oneself to normal defaults. The reader may
well ask whether one would not like to consider, anyway, a more general form
of defaults: the semi-normal defaults. A semi-normal default a:e∧b
b
means that
if a is known to be true and there is no evidence that e ∧ b is false, then b
should be presumed to be true. Let a be a tautology, i.e., true and e and b be
different propositional variables (q and p respectively). Suppose we accept
the semi-normal default :q∧p
p
. There is general agreement about the following
points:
• if the information at hand c is a tautology, i.e., we have no specific
information, we should presume that p is true, since there is no evidence
that q ∧ p does not hold,
• if c is ¬q, i.e., we know for sure that q does not hold, we should not
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use the default information and therefore we should not presume p,
• but, if we have no specific information, we should not presume that q
holds (why should we?).
The three points above provide a counter-example to the rule of Rational
Monotonicity of [12]: we accept true ∼ p, but neither true ∼ ¬¬q, nor
¬q ∼ p. Even the simplest isolated non-normal default cannot be given a
rational interpretation. This remark is very important in view of the fact
that the efforts to harness Logic Programming to Nonmonotonic Reasoning
take as their basic component rules of the form
a← b ,¬c
meaning conclude a if b has been concluded and c cannot be concluded. This
is essentially equivalent to considering the semi-normal default
b : a ∧ ¬c
a,
or to considering the not even semi-normal default
b : ¬c
a
and will lead to a consequence relation that is not rational. All we have
shown here is that non-normal defaults or the logic programming approach
to nonmonotonic reasoning are incompatible with the property of rational
monotonicity, which is central to this and previous papers.
8 Competing but equal defaults
After dealing, in Section 6, with single defaults, we shall treat now the more
interesting case of a set of interacting normal defaults. In general, given a set
of defaults D, this set defines a ranking of the defaults, as explained in [12].
This ranking will be described in full in Section 9.1. The ranking of a default
(a : b) relative to D depends only on its antecedent a and, as we shall see in
Section 10, defaults of higher ranking (they correspond to exceptions) should
be considered stronger than those of lower ranking. In this Section, we shall
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deal with the case all defaults have the same rank, i.e., all defaults are equal
in strength and none of them correspond to an exception. This happens
only when all elements of D have rank zero, as will be clear in Section 9.1.
It is clear that, when considering such defaults, we should always assume
that as many defaults as possible are satisfied (i.e. not violated). We should
therefore always prefer violating a smaller set of defaults to violating a larger
one. One may hesitate about the meaning to be given to “smaller”: set
inclusion or smaller size. The main conclusion of our considerations will be
that sets of defaults should (for rationality’s sake) be compared by their size,
not by set inclusion.
We choose an example isomorphic to the musicians example of [4, Section
4.4], but we shall first ask about it questions that are different from those
asked traditionally.
Example 7 (Musicians) Let p, q and r be different propositional variables.
LetD contain the three following defaults: {(: p), (: q), (: r)}. In other words,
p, q and r are assumed to hold by default. If we learn that c
def
= ¬p ∧ ¬q ∨ ¬r
holds, i.e., that either both p and q are false, contrary to expectation, or, also
contrary to expectation, r does not hold, what should we assume? Should
one of the two possibilities (¬p ∧ ¬q) and ¬r be assumed more likely than
the other one?
In [15], D. Poole claims we should not. He claims there are two different
maximal subsets of the material counterpart of D consistent with c (two
bases for c): {p, q} and {r} and he proposes that we presume true only those
formulas that are both in Cn(r, c) and in Cn(p, q, c). In particular, we should
not presume p to be true. But, we should presume p↔ q to hold. Also,
if we learn that c ∧ ¬p holds, we should presume true only those formulas
that are both in Cn(r, c,¬p) = Cn(r, c) and in Cn(q, c,¬p). In particular, we
should not presume the truth of p↔ q. D. Poole’s proposal, therefore, does
not satisfy the Rational Monotonicity principle.
Guided by Thesis 1.1 of [12], that requires Rational Monotonicity, a slight
modification of Poole’s ideas will be put forward now. This modification is
also supported by the Maximal Entropy approach of [6]. The two bases
above should not be considered equivalently plausible. The larger one, which
contains two defaults should be considered more plausible than the one con-
taining only a single default. In other terms, situations that violate two
defaults should be considered less plausible than those that violate only one
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default. Here is a model-theoretic description. We shall consider the (propo-
sitional) models of our language, and rank them by the number of defaults
of D they violate. A model m violates a default a ∼ b iff it does not sat-
isfy the material implication a→ b, i.e., iff m |= a ∧ ¬b. The most normal
models are those that violate no default of D: they constitute the bottom
level (zero) of our modular model. Slightly less normal are those models that
violate one single default: they constitute level one of our model. In general,
level i is constituted by all models that violate exactly i members of D. The
nonmonotonic consequence relation defined by this model is the one defined
by D. It is rational, since the model described is ranked and consequence re-
lations defined by modular models are rational (Lemma 3.9 of [12]). Coming
back to the Musicians example: if we learn that c
def
= ¬p ∧ ¬q ∨ ¬r holds, ¬r
should be presumed true. We should therefore presume p to be true.
We provided, just above, a model-theoretic description of our proposal.
An equivalent description in terms of “bases”, in the spirit of [15], is provided
now. The same bases were also considered in [1]. Let E = {ei} be a finite
set of formulas. Let c be a formula.
Definition 1 A subset F of E is said to be a maxbase for c iff c is consistent
with F and there is no subset F ′ of E, | F ′ |>| F | that is consistent with c.
Theorem 1 Let D be a set of defaults such that all elements of D have
rank zero (with respect to D). Let E be the set of material implications
corresponding to the defaults of D. The consequence relation defined by the
model-theoretic description above is characterized by:
a ∼ b iff for every maxbase F of E for a F, a |= b. (1)
.
Theorem 1 implies that the relation defined by Equation (1) is rational.
Proof: First, some remarks. Let n be the size of the set D.
1. If a is satisfied by some model of level i (0 ≤ i ≤ n), then, there is a
maxbase for a, and all maxbases for a are of size larger or equal to
n− i.
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2. If F is a maxbase of size k (0 ≤ k ≤ n) for a, then, there is a model of
level n− k that satisfies a, and no model of lower level satisfies a.
3. There is no maxbase for a iff a is a logical contradiction.
Suppose a ∼ b. If no model satisfies a, a is a logical contradiction and
X, a |= b for any X . Suppose, then, that a is satisfied by some model of
level i, but by no model of lower level. Any model of level i that satisfies
a, satisfies b, by hypothesis. Let F be a maxbase for a. By remark (2),
n− | F |= i. Any model that satisfies F is obviously of level less or equal
to n− | F |= i. Any model that satisfies F and a is therefore of level i and
satisfies b, by hypothesis. We conclude that F, a |= b.
Suppose, now, that for any maxbase F for a we have F, a |= b. If there is
no maxbase for a, then, by remark (3), a is a logical contradiction and a ∼ b.
Suppose, then, the maxbases for a are of size k. There is, by remark (2), a
model of a of level n− k, and there is no model of level less than n− k that
satisfies a. We must show that any model of a of level n− k satisfies b. Let
m be such a model. Since m violates n− k defaults, it satisfies a set M of k
defaults. But M is consistent with a, since m |= a. The size of M is the size
of the maxbases for a, therefore M is a maxbase for a and, since M, a |= b,
we conclude that m |= b.
Example 8 (Musicians, continued) We shall now describe our solution
to the questions traditionally asked about the musicians’ example and gener-
ally used to demonstrate that counterfactuals do not satisfy Rational Monoto-
nicity. Suppose our specific information is c
def
= p ∧ ¬r ∨ ¬p ∧ r. There are
two maxbases: {p, q} and {q, r}. We shall therefore presume that q holds and
we shall not presume that d
def
= q ∧ r ∨ ¬q ∧ ¬r holds. This is the common
wisdom and the present perspective subscribes to it.
Suppose now that our specific information is c ∧ ¬d, or, equivalently,
p ∧ q ∧ ¬r ∨ ¬p ∧ ¬q ∧ r. The common wisdom, defended in [4], would like
to convince us that we should not presume q to be true. The position de-
fended here, presumes that q is true (and also p and ¬r) because this sit-
uation violates only one default (: r) whereas the other possible situation:
¬p ∧ ¬q ∧ r violates two defaults.
The reader may suspect that our policy gives results that are extremely
sensitive to the way the defaults are presented. Indeed, the way defaults are
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presented is important, and our perspective on defaults does not enjoy the
nice global properties of rational closure described in [12, Section 5.5] that
make it invariant under the addition or deletion of entailed defaults. Two
examples of this phenomenon will be described now. The first one shows
that the addition to D of a default entailed by D may add new conclusions.
The second one shows that the addition to D of a default entailed by D
may force us to withdraw previous conclusions. The examples presented are
very simple and natural and should convince the reader that any presumptive
reading of defaults leads to a high sensitivity to the presentation of the default
information. This sensitivity is, probably, a drawback of the lexicographic
closure. The following examples should convince the reader that this problem
is inevitably brought about by a presumptive understanding of defaults. If
we had decided to consider multisets of defaults, instead of sets, thus allowing
certain (stronger) defaults to appear a number of times inD, our construction
would had been sensitive to the number of times each default appears in D.
Example 9 (Adding entailed defaults may add conclusions) LetD be
the singleton {(: p ∧ q)}. The default (identifying defaults and conditional
assertions) (: p) is obviously entailed by D. But the default (¬p ∨ ¬q : p) is
not entailed by D, the antecedent being inconsistent with the only default
of D. Nevertheless (¬p ∨ ¬q : p) is entailed by the set {(: p ∧ q), (: p)}, since
its antecedent is consistent with the second default. The behavior of the
corresponding Poole system is the same.
Example 10 (Adding entailed defaults may delete conclusions) Let
D be the set {(: p), (: q)}. Both defaults (: p↔ q) and (¬p : q) are entailed
by D. But (¬p : q) is not entailed by the set {(: p), (: q), (: p↔ q)}, since the
antecedent is consistent with both the last defaults separately but not to-
gether, and there are therefore two maxbases. In this case also, the behavior
of the corresponding Poole systems is the same.
9 Lexicographic closure
9.1 Introduction and definition
In the previous Section we discussed the treatment of conflicting defaults that
had the same precedence. We shall now treat arbitrary conflicting defaults,
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and define the construction we propose in full generality. We must take into
account the fact that defaults may have different weight, or precedence. For-
tunately, the correct definition of the relative precedence of defaults has been
obtained in a previous work. Given a finite set of defaults D, the precedence
of a default is given by its rank (higher rank means higher precedence), i.e.,
by the rank of its antecedent as defined in [12, Section 2.6]. The definition
presented here is equivalent to the original definition, by Corollary 5.22 there.
We shall now remind the reader of this definition. Let D be a finite set of
defaults, and D˜ the set of its material counterparts. Let a be a formula. We
shall put E0 = D. If a does not have rank less than i, but is consistent with
E˜i, it has rank i. The set Ei+1 is the subset of Ei that contains all defaults
(a : b) of D for which a does not have rank less or equal to i. We shall put
Di = Ei −Ei+1, and let D∞ be the set of all elements of D that have no
rank, i.e., have infinite rank. Elements of D∞ have precedence over all other
defaults. Notice that, since D is finite, all Di’s are empty after a certain
point, except possibly D∞. There is a k such that for any i, k ≤ i <∞,
Di = ∅. The smallest such number k will be called the order of the set D.
The set D may be partitioned into D∞ ⊕Dk−1 ⊕Dk−2 ⊕ . . .⊕D0.
We remind the reader that the rational closure of the set D, defined in [10]
and studied in depth in [12] (see Theorem 5.17 and Lemma 2.24) is the set
of defaults D that consists of all defaults (a : b) such that the rank of a is
strictly less than the rank of a ∧ ¬b (equivalently, the rank of a ∧ b is strictly
less than the rank of a ∧ ¬b), or such that a has no rank. We shall now define
another closure for D, the lexicographic closure. We define the lexicographic
closure by way of a modular model in which every model is ranked by the set
of defaults it violates. A similar presentation may be used to define rational
closure, it will also be described.
9.2 The model-theoretic description
As usual, we shall suppose a finite set D of defaults is given. We shall
describe the consequence relation defined by D, the lexicographic closure
of D, Dl as the consequence relation defined by a certain modular model,
MD. To define this model, we need to order the propositional models by
some modular ordering. We shall order the propositional models by ordering
the sets of defaults (of D) that they violate: each model m violates a set
Dm ⊆ D of defaults. How should we order the subsets of D? Intuitively, we
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are looking for a “degree of seriousness”. We prefer to violate a “lighter” set
of defaults than a more serious one, i.e., a propositional model that violates
a lighter set of defaults is more normal than a model that violates a more
serious set. There are two criteria that must be taken into account when
deciding which of two sets is more serious:
• the size of the set: the smaller the set, the less serious it is. We have
seen in Section 8, that “smaller” should be taken here to mean “of
smaller size”, and
• the seriousness of the elements of the set, it is less serious to violate a
less specific default than a more specific default, i.e. a default of lower
rank than a default of higher rank.
The reader should notice here that our definition is in no way circular. The
lexicographic closure is defined in terms of a specific modular model that
is, in turn, defined in terms of the ranks of the formulas involved. These
ranks have been defined above, by a straightforward inductive definition.
The ranks of the formulas have a close relationship with the ordering of the
modular model that defines the rational closure of D, but this is a different
modular model. In fact, the model we are describing now is a refinement
of the model that defines rational closure (a level may split into a number
of sublevels). The next question, now, is how should we compose those
two criteria? The principle of rationality will trace the way for us. We
want a modular ordering on the subsets of D. Each one of the criteria
above gives a modular ordering. Is there a general way to combine two
modular orderings and obtain a modular ordering? Yes, a lexicographic
(i.e. consider one criterion as the principal criterion, the other as secondary)
composition of modular orderings is a modular ordering. Which of the two
criteria above should be considered as the major criterion? Clearly the second
one: specificity. We should prefer violating two defaults of low specificity to
violating one of high specificity.
Example 11 Let D = {(: p), (: q), (: x), (y : ¬x), (y : r)}. Suppose our as-
sumptions are y ∧ (¬p ∧ ¬q ∨ ¬r). You may imagine that p, q and x are
generic properties (of birds, say), and that y is a class of birds that are ex-
ceptional with respect to x. The property r is a generic property of y birds.
Suppose we have a bird that is part of the y class, and is known to be, either
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exceptional with respect to two generic properties of birds, or exceptional
with respect to one generic property of the sub-class y. Presumption of typ-
icality (see Section 3.1), from the last default of D proposes the conclusion
r (and therefore ¬p and ¬q). Presumption of independence proposes the
conclusions p and q (and therefore ¬r). Priority to typicality convinces us
to accept the former and reject the latter.
Therefore, to decide which of two sets of defaults is more serious, we shall
partition those sets into subsets of defaults of equal ranks and compare (by
size) rank by rank, starting with the higher ranks. As soon (in terms of
ranks) as a decision can be made, we decide and stop.
Definition 2 Let D be a set of defaults and k its order. To every subset
X ⊆ D may be associated a k + 1-tuple of natural numbers: 〈n0, . . . , nk〉,
where n0 =| D∞ ∩X |, n1 =| Dk−1 ∩X |, and in general, for i = 1, . . . , k,
ni =| Dk−i ∩X |. In other terms, n0 is the number of defaults of X that
have no rank and, for 0 < i ≤ k, ni is the number of defaults of X that have
rank k − i. We shall order the subsets of D by the natural lexicographic
ordering on their associated tuples. This is a strict modular partial ordering:
it will be denoted by ≺, (the seriousness ordering).
The seriousness ordering on sets of defaults is used to order the propositional
models: m ≺ m′ iff V (m) ≺ V (m′), where V (m) ⊆ D is the set of defaults
violated by m. This modular ordering on models defines a modular preferen-
tial model, that, in turn defines a consequence relation, Dl, the lexicographic
closure of D. The reader may check that all examples treated in this paper
conform to the definition above.
Let us, now, before we give an alternative description of lexicographic
closure, briefly digress to see that rational closure may be defined by a specific
seriousness ordering, different from the one defined in Definition 2.
Definition 3 Let X1 and X2 be subsets of a set D of defaults and k its order.
Let n1i and n
2
i , for i = 1, . . . , k, be the size of the partitions of X1 and X2
respectively. Let mj be the smallest i such that nji 6= 0, for j = 1, 2. We shall
write X1 ≪ X2 iff m
1 > m2.
Clearly X1 ≪ X2 implies X1 ≺ X2, i.e., ≪ is coarser than ≺.
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Theorem 2 Suppose a has a finite rank. The conditional assertion a ∼ b is
a member of the rational closure of D iff it is satisfied by the modular model
in which each propositional model is ranked by the ≪ ordering on the set of
defaults it violates.
Proof: Suppose the rank of a is strictly less than that of a ∧ ¬b, and that m
is a propositional model that satisfies a and is minimal among those for the
≪ ordering. If a has rank l, there is a model that satisfies a and violates no
default of D of rank greater or equal to l. We conclude that m violates no
such default and therefore satisfies no formula of rank strictly greater than
l. The model m does not satisfy a ∧ ¬b, and therefore satisfies b.
Suppose, now, that all propositional models that satisfy a and are minimal
in the ≪ ordering for that property, also satisfy b. Let the rank of a be k.
Since there is a propositional model that satisfies a and violates no default
of rank greater or equal to k, all models that satisfy a and violate no default
of rank greater or equal to k satisfy b. We conclude that the rank of a ∧ ¬b
is greater than k.
We may now show that the lexicographic closure is a superset of the ratio-
nal closure, at least for defaults of finite rank, thus almost complying with
Thesis 5.25 of [12].
Theorem 3 If a has a finite rank and a ∼ b is an element of the rational
closure of D, then it is an element of its lexicographic closure.
Proof: Suppose a has a finite rank and a ∼ b is an element of the rational
closure of D. By Theorem 2, a ∼ b is satisfied in the modular model defined
by ≪. It is therefore satisfied in any modular model defined by a finer
relation. We noticed, just following Definition 3, that ≺ is such a finer
relation.
A characterization of the lexicographic closure in terms of bases will be de-
scribed now.
9.3 Bases
Definition 4 Let a be a formula, and B a subset of D. We shall say that
B is a basis for a iff a is consistent with B˜, the material counterpart of B,
and, B is maximal with respect to the seriousness ordering for this property.
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The following lemma may help explain the structure of bases, but is not used
in the sequel.
Lemma 1 If a has rank i (a has no rank is understood as a having an infinite
rank) and B is a basis for a, then, for any j ≥ i, Dj ⊆ B.
In other terms, any basis for a is full, for all indexes larger or equal to the
rank of a.
Proof: Since a has rank i, for any j ≥ i, a is consistent with Ej and therefore
with Dj ∪B ∩ Ej+1 ⊆ Ej .
Theorem 4 The default (a : b) is in Dl, the lexicographic closure D iff, for
any basis B for a, B˜, a |= b.
Proof: The proof is a generalization of that of Theorem 1. Let k be the
order of D. Let di =| Di | for i = 0, . . . , k − 1,∞.
1. If a is satisfied by some model of seriousness level (i0, . . . , ik), then,
there is a basis for a of level (d∞ − i0, dk−1 − i1, . . . , d0 − ik), and all
bases for a have this level.
2. If B is a basis of level (l0, . . . , lk) for a, then, there is a model of level
(d∞ − l0, dk−1 − l1, . . . , d0 − lk) that satisfy a, and no model of strictly
smaller seriousness satisfy a.
3. There is no basis for a iff a is a logical contradiction.
Suppose, first, that a ∼ b ∈ Dl. If no model satisfies a, a is a logical
contradiction and X, a |= b for any X . Suppose, then, that a is satisfied by
some model of level (i0, . . . , ik), but by no model of lower level. Any model
of level (i0, . . . , ik) that satisfies a, satisfies b, by hypothesis. Let B be a
basis for a, of seriousness (b∞, . . . , b0). By remark (2), dj − bk−j = ik−j, for
j = 0, . . . , k − 1, and d∞ − b0 = i0. Any model that satisfies B is obviously
of seriousness level less or equal to (d∞ − b0, dk−1 − b1, . . . , d0 − bk), i.e., of
level less or equal i0, . . . , ik. Any model that satisfies B and a is therefore of
level i0, . . . , ik, and satisfies b, by hypothesis. We conclude that B, a |= b.
Suppose, now, that for any basis B for a we have B, a |= b. If there is no
basis for a, then, by remark (3), a is a logical contradiction and a ∼ b ∈ Dl.
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Suppose, then, the bases for a are of seriousness (b0, . . . , bk). There is, by
remark (2), a model of a of level l = (d∞ − b0, . . . , d0 − bk), and there is no
model of level less than l that satisfies a. We must show that any model of
a of level l satisfies b. Let m be such a model. Since m violates dj − bk−j
defaults of rank j, it satisfies a set M containing bk−j defaults of rank j. But
M is consistent with a, since m |= a. The seriousness of M is (b0, . . . , bk),
the seriousness of the bases for a. Therefore M is a basis for a and, since
M, a |= b, we conclude that m |= b.
We shall now describe the lexicographic closure of a number of sets of de-
faults, some of them well-known from the literature.
10 Examples
In this Section, motivating examples will be described, indicating, for each
of them the conclusions endorsed by the lexicographic closure. My goal is
to, gradually, convince the reader, that each one of the decisions taken in the
process of defining the lexicographic closure was reasonable. My goal is not to
convince the reader that lexicographic closure provides the intuitively correct
answer once the propositional variables have been interpreted in some man-
ner that is well-known in the folklore of the field, because I believe that, in
most cases, we intuitively treat interpreted formulas in a meaning-dependent
manner, not in the formal, meaning-independent way that is the hallmark
of logic. In other terms, once the variables are interpreted, there is no way
of knowing whether the intuitive conclusions come from formal logical con-
siderations or from world knowledge the reasoner has about the situations
or objects the interpreted variables refer to. A first example exemplifies why
one needs to give precedence to defaults describing exceptional cases over
those that describe more normal cases.
Example 12 (Exceptions) Let D = {(: p), (: q), (¬p : ¬q)}. Here p and q
hold by default, and when p does not hold, then, by default q does not hold
either. Suppose we know that p does not hold. Then, obviously we cannot
use the first default. But, we could use the second one to conclude q or the
third one to conclude ¬q. We obviously want to presume ¬q, and we need to
say that the third default has precedence over the second one. Fortunately, it
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is not difficult to justify why the third default has precedence over the other
ones. It (i.e., its antecedent) has rank one whereas the two other defaults
have rank zero. This comes from the fact that the antecedents of the first two
defaults (true), describe some unexceptional situation, while ¬p describes an
unexpected, exceptional situation since p is, by default, presumed to be true.
The technical description of the lexicographic closure follows. The order
of D is two. The first two defaults of D have rank zero, the last one has
rank one. The most normal models (those that have level zero), are those
that satisfy p and q (and therefore ¬p→ ¬q). On level one, we find those
models that satisfy ¬p→ ¬q and violate exactly one of p or q: the models
that satisfy p and ¬q. The third level contains those models that violate
both p and q, but satisfy ¬p→ ¬q, i.e. the models satisfying ¬p and ¬q.
The fourth level contains all models violating ¬p→ ¬q, but satisfying p and
q; it is empty. The fifth level contains all models violating ¬p→ ¬q, and
exactly one of p and q: it contains one model. The sixth level is empty.
So, we must give precedence to defaults of higher rank over defaults of lower
rank. Notice that rank is really all the difference between the default (a : b)
and the default (: a→ b). The second one has always rank zero, while the
first one may have a much higher rank (if a is presumed to be false) and
is therefore more powerful. The reader may easily check that the first two
defaults of D have rank zero, whereas the third one has rank one. Let us
now treat the similar but more classical penguin example.
Example 13 (Penguins) Let D = {(p : q), (r : p), (r : ¬q)}. The default
(: ¬r) is entailed by D and the second and third defaults have rank one,
whereas the first default has rank zero. The defaults (r : ¬q) and (p ∧ r : ¬q)
are entailed by D whereas (r : q) is not.
Technically, the rank of D is two. At level zero: all models satisfying
p → q and ¬r. At level one: all models satisfying p and 6= q, and those
satisfying r, ¬p and ¬q. Level two is empty. Level three: all models satisfying
r, q and p. Level four: all models satisfying r, q and ¬p. Level five: empty.
In the present proposal, this precedence of defaults of higher rank is in a sense
(or in two ways) absolute: one should not trade the violation of a default
of rank n + 1 for the violation of any number of defaults of rank less than
or equal to n. On this point, the present proposal is in disagreement with
the Principle of Maximal Entropy as proposed in [7]. The following example
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will exhibit this disagreement, it is not meant to support one construction
against the other.
Example 14 (Winged Penguins) LetD = {(b : w), (b : f), (p : b), (p : ¬f)}.
The default (p ∧ (f ∨ ¬w) : b) is entailed by D, since the only basis for
p ∧ (f ∨ ¬w) is the set {(p : b), (p : ¬f)}, containing all defaults of rank one.
In fact, even (p ∧ (f ∨ ¬w) : b ∧ ¬f ∧ ¬w) is entailed byD. But the Principle
of Maximal Entropy of [7] will consider as equivalent
• to violate two defaults of rank zero: ((b : w) and (b : f), and
• to violate one default of rank one: (p : b),
and therefore will not accept (p ∧ (f ∨ ¬w) : b). Notice that the set D is
Minimal Core in the sense of [7].
Example 15 (Exceptions again) Let
D = {(: r), (: p), (: q), (¬p : ¬q), (¬p : ¬r)}.
Suppose our specific information is ¬p ∧ q, which means the situation is
doubly exceptional: p is presumed true but is in fact false, and when p is
false q is presumed false, but it is true. In other words the rank of ¬p ∧ q is
two. Should we presume r to be true or false? It is clear we should presume
it false, since the default (¬p : ¬r) talks about a situation closer to the one
at hand than the default (: r), and should have precedence over it. But
notice that our information shows that the situation described by ¬p ∧ q is
exceptional with respect to the one described by ¬p.
11 Discussion
The lexicographic closure Dl of a finite set D of defaults is defined by a
modular model in which all propositional models appear, at some level. An
assertion of the form a ∼ false will appear in Dl only if a is a logical con-
tradition. In other terms, lexicographic closure is, in the terminology of [13],
consistency preserving. This is indeed one of the hallmarks of Default Rea-
soning a` la Reiter as attested by the discussion in [16], and in particular
Corollary 2.2 there.
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Since there has been a lot of discussion in the literature, in particular
in [5] and [3], of the principle of Transitivity, it is probably worth a short
discussion.
The question of Transitivity is: should we accept (a : c) on the basis of
the two defaults (a : b) and (b : c)? The answer proposed here, and which
follows from our construction, is that, if we have both (a : b) and (b : c), and
if a and b are both of the same rank, then we should also accept (a : c). Note
that, if we accept (a : b), then b has rank lower or equal to that of a: indeed
if the rank of b was larger than that of a, the rational closure of our set of
defaults would include a ∨ b ∼ ¬b and therefore a ∼ ¬b, and, by Theorem 3,
we would accept (a : ¬b) in the lexicographic closure. If the rank of a is
strictly greater than that of b, then we are not guaranteed that(b : c) will be
part of all bases for a.
Given a finite set D of defaults and a default (a : b), how difficult is it to
decide whether (a : b) is entailed by D? This decision seems to require the
computation of the ranks of the defaults of D, but this is relatively easy: a
quadratic number of satisfiabilty problems. It seems that it also requires the
consideration of a possibly large number of subsets of D and seems therefore
inherently exponential. The rational closure construction of [12] provides a
quick and dirty approximation to this construction in the following sense:
if a default belongs to the rational closure it is entailed (up to a slightly
different treatment of formulas that have no rank). The case in which all
defaults have a Horn structure, needs further study. One may perhaps avoid
the exponential blow-up in this case.
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